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Comparative Study of Federation Proposals for Nepal ∗
Vijaya R. Sharma ♣
An elected constituent assembly is planned to frame a new
constitution of Nepal. This paper argues for a federal system of
governance and reviews various federal proposals that have been made so
far, some of which suggest territorial subdivision and some suggest
cultural subdivision of the country. This paper argues that a cultural
subdivision offers a greater promise of durable peace and stability of
federation than a territorial subdivision and would also help improve
economic efficiency in delivery of governmental services. Further, it
proposes a cultural federation of 15 small size states, with directly elected
governors in the states and a proportional system of representation in the
state assemblies.

The greater the variety of parties and interests, the smaller the probability that a
majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of other
citizens; or if such a common motive exists, it will be more difficult for all who
feel it to discover their own strength, and to act in unison with each other.
James Madison in Federalist No. 10

Introduction
Nepal is passing through a critical stage of history. A constituent
assembly (CA) election is planned within 2007. Restructuring of the
Nepalese State would be an important issue for the elected CA members to
∗
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resolve. This task would be happening in the backdrop of the last eleven
years of Maoist insurgency, during which period this country incurred
huge human and economic costs. More than 13,000 human lives were lost
and more than 50,000 persons were displaced from their homes due to
insurgency, and all of those displaced have not been able to return home
yet (INSEC 2006). Families were forced to give away their sons and
daughters to join Maoists’ People’s Liberation Army. Maoists almost
annihilated the political opposition in the areas of their control, by
forcefully evicting, brutally torturing, and sometimes even killing the
cadres of Nepali Congress (NC), Communist Party of Nepal – Unified
Marxist-Leninist (UML), and the Rastriya Prajatantra Party (RPP).
Maoists extorted, looted, and collected more than Rs. 5 billion and
damaged governmental properties and infrastructures worth about Rs. 300
million during those years (Shrestha 2003). They seized an unknown
amount of land and property of landowners and caused economic
disruptions through numerous bandhs, strikes, and labor problems in
businesses. The cost of doing business escalated tremendously, and there
was a breakdown of private property rights system in the areas controlled
by Maoists. The political instability caused by insurgency unleashed
violent tendencies even among some sections of sociocultural groups, like
Limbuwan Liberation Front, Khambuwan Liberation Front, Madhesi
Liberation Front, and Newa Liberation Front, to threaten violence to back
up their demands for cultural rights and political autonomy.
The Maoists, the Nepal Federation of Indigenous Nationalities,
various organizations of Madhesis, and many scholars have now
demanded federal restructuring of Nepal to grant political autonomy to
states and to have a proportional representation (PR) system for ensuring a
fair representation of all sociocultural groups in any future national
parliament or legislative assembly. There is an apparent unanimity among
all political parties on the issue of PR system, but such unanimity is not
visible on federal restructuring yet. NC (both factions) and RPP remain
undecided, whereas the Communist Party of Nepal – Maoists (CPN-M),
UML, other communist parties, the both factions of Nepal Sadbhawana
Party, and Rastriya Janashakti Party have declared support or demanded
federal restructuring. This paper attempts to argue why and what federal
structure is best suited for Nepal. i
Why Federal Structure?
There is a wide disparity in income, education, and participation in
political process among different socio-cultural groups and among
1
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different regions of the country, evidences of which shall be presented
later in the paper. Many scholars believe that this disparity is a direct
outcome of the unitary system of governance, which has given rise to
ethnic strife. Ethnic strives aggravated during the democracy period
because ethnic protests and rebellions tend to be greater in multi-ethnic
countries under democratic regimes than under authoritarian regimes
(Saideman et al. 2002). ii Advocates of marginalized socio-cultural groups
and impoverished regions propose a federal restructuring of the country
and political autonomy to constituent states of the federation.
In a federal system, two or three levels of government rule the
same land and people: the national or federal government, the state or
provincial government, and in some cases also the local government. The
each level of government has its autonomous spheres of authority
guaranteed and protected by the constitution of the land. It is argued that
having separate states in Nepal for different sociocultural groups and/or
different regions will allow the marginalized groups and regions to
conduct schooling and other businesses in their own language and to
freely practice their own culture and tradition and to pursue programs and
policies that best suit the needs of the regions.
If not a federal system, what alternative options are available to
Nepal? For the sake of argument, one option could be to revert back to
autocracy, because ethnic conflicts are generally reported to be fewer in
autocratic regimes (Saideman et. al. 2002; see Endnote i also). King
Gyanendra used this option through an unconstitutional takeover of
executive powers of the state from 2002 to 2006. But, he seriously failed.
He faced people’s revolt and has now been stripped of constitutional
monarchical rights and privileges. Through Janandolan-II, Nepalis have
clearly spoken against authoritarianism.
Another alternative to federalism could have been the
decentralization of central government’s powers and responsibilities to
local governments, coupled with appropriate provisions in the constitution
on issues related to language, culture, and religion. If such measures were
sincerely undertaken in the past, decentralization could have proved an
incremental progressive solution for the evolution of democracy and
federalism in Nepal. Bolton and Roland (1997) argues that any benefits of
federal subdivision of a country may be achieved within a unified nation
by replicating the administrative structure with a suitable degree of
decentralization of authority to lower level local governments. Such an
arrangement is likely to be more cost effective than creating a federal
structure. But, in spite of 40 years of history of decentralization efforts in
2
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Nepal, the necessary devolution of power and strengthening of
institutional infrastructure associated with a true decentralization were
never pursued vigorously by the past governments, including those during
the last 12 years (1990 – 2002) of democratic governance (see Gurung H.
2003a). Therefore, decentralization slogan has lost political credibility,
and the Maoists successfully substituted this slogan with a slogan of selfdetermination and autonomy to indigenous nationalities to attract youths
from marginalized indigenous nationalities for recruitment as cadres and
to expand political support for insurgency among them and in the
marginalized regions, especially the mid and far-west hills of Nepal.
Maoists have thus heightened the aspirations of marginalized sections of
the country, who are now demanding federalism. Recent political events,
including the political turmoil in Tarai, have moved past the option of
decentralization. The genie of federalism has already escaped, and it
would be difficult to bottle it back. Therefore, reforming the political
system of Nepal into a federation of autonomous states is the best option
available at this juncture of history.
Some may insist to retain the current unitary system of governance
because a unified country offers relatively a larger market size, allows
opportunities for economies of scale in production, and also allows the
cost of providing public good services to be spread over a larger
population, thus requiring a smaller tax burden on the citizens. But, these
are only one side of the equation of economic efficiency. Economic
efficiency is achieved by balancing the demand and supply forces. The
above were the supply considerations. On the demand side, federalism
subdivides the country into culturally and/or economically homogeneous
states with people of similar needs or preferences; thus, it allows state
governments to better tailor their services to suit the specific preferences
and needs of residents. Thus, there is a higher probability that the largest
number of people will find happiness in federalism (Hayek 1945). Also,
federalism provides individuals unsatisfied with conditions in their current
state of residence the option to move to another state that matches their
preferences. For this to happen, the freedom of movement of people and
goods across states needs to be guaranteed by the constitution. This option
of movement may introduce a healthy horizontal competition among states
and may enhance the efficiency of subnational governments, just as
increased competition tends to raise the efficiency of a market (Tiebout
1956). iii
Even on the supply side, different governmental services tend to
have different efficient scales of operation. Fire, public safety, and
3
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ambulance services are best provided at the subnational level, whereas the
national defense, large environmental projects that have spillover effects
beyond the boundary of a state, and activities with economies of scale are
better handled by the national government. Federalism, through its
governance structure of multiple layers of government, shall provide the
flexibility to optimally allocate governmental functions among national
and subnational governments. iv
There is one more argument in favor of federalism in Nepal. In the
last 12 years of democracy, there were nine changes in prime ministers.
Frequent changes in the central government brought political instability,
which caused the government in power to remain preoccupied with
struggle for survival; consequently, developmental works and delivery of
governmental services to people suffered. With multiple layers of
government in federalism, the state or provincial governments can keep
carrying on developmental works and delivery of services, even when the
central government is unstable.
The biggest reason of opposition to federalism is the fear of
disintegration of the country (Basnet 2006). When the boundaries of a
province within a federation are demarcated to house a culturally or
economically homogenous group of people, the fear is whether the people
in the province will be tempted to secede through their constitutional right
of self-determination (if such a right exists) or through an armed rebellion.
Indeed, the probability of secession is relatively higher in a democratic
regime than in an autocratic regime, according to Alesina and Spolaore
(1997). But, this same study has also argued that a federal system of
governance with autonomous states could prove an intervening political
structure, an alternative to secession. The argument is based on the finding
that, simultaneously with a trend of secession among democratic
countries, there is a tendency among small countries to form economic
integration among them to recover the loss of economic efficiency arising
from smaller market size and smaller scale of operation.
There are 25 countries in this world that practice a federal system,
and according to Stepan (1998), all multinational democracies are federal:
Switzerland, Canada, Belgium, Spain, and India. v In countries where
sociocultural, linguistic, and/or religious cleavages exist, many scholars
believe that federalism provides a constitutional system to hold the diverse
sociocultural groups together by devolving powers to states, especially
those powers that relate to culture, tradition, religion, and language.
Among a series of papers on why federalism has worked and democracy
has survived in India, Varshney (1998) and Manor (1998) have pointed
4
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out that although ethnic conflicts keep breaking out in India imparting a
false impression to observers that the democratic system of the country is
breaking down, federalism has actually helped to confine most conflicts
within individual regions, allowing the rest of India to keep functioning
under routine democratic processes. Federalism thus helps to quarantine
conflicts in a region, whereas any ethnic conflict in a unitary system can
potentially become a national issue, directly aimed at the central
government, and can disrupt and challenge the democratic polity of the
whole country.
Federation Proposals, Issues, and Problems
Various individuals and political parties have presented a number
of federal proposals for Nepal, which mainly fall in two categories. One
category of proposals suggests a pure territorial subdivision of the country
with no regard to socio-cultural diversity, whereas the other category of
proposals suggests a socio-cultural subdivision. Theoretically speaking, a
pure territorial federation is best suited to large countries, where the vast
physical size makes it difficult to govern the whole country from the
center. Australia is the best example of such a federation. Nepal is not a
large country; yet, for the purpose of territorial federation one can think of
either a topographic subdivision (mountain, hills, and Tarai), or an
administrative development-region or zonal-type subdivision (eastern,
central, western, mid-western, and far-western regions), or a certain
combination of both topographic and regional subdivisions. Table 1
compares the per-capita income (PCI) and human development index
(HDI) figures of each of the development and topographic subdivision of
the country for Year 2001; these figures have been extracted from UNDP
(2004). The PCI figures in the table are presented as percentages of the
national average nominal PCI of Rs. 17,722.
If one assumes that longer physical distances from the seat of the
government and/or higher altitude terrain cause governance difficulty and
thus impede development of an area, and if one likes to propose a
territorial governance structure to address these causal factors, then Table
1 suggests the desirability of two territorial subdivision of Nepal: the West
Nepal (mid and far-west regions of the country) and the East Nepal (the
rest of the country). The most prominent development disparity can be
observed between these two parts of the country; especially, the mountain
areas of the West Nepal lag behind both in per-capita income and HDI.
There is no glaring disparity among the Eastern, Central, and Western
Regions of East Nepal.
5
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Let us now examine how the proponents of territorial federation
have actually chosen to subdivide the country. Bohara (2003) suggests
transforming the current five development regions of the country into five
autonomous federal regions. He forwards four reasons for such a proposal.
One, such a regional subdivision already exists and requires no redrawing
of geographic boundaries. Two, it would give priority to capturing
regional sentiment and voice. Three, in his view any ethnic subdivision of
country is dangerous and counterproductive for a small and highly diverse
country like Nepal. Four, the current regional structure mirrors the major
river basins of Nepal and will make development of water resources easier
by minimizing hill versus Tarai conflicts in sharing of water resources. As
the proposal is to use the existing regional structure for federation, a brief
discussion on the history of regional structure would be relevant here. This
structure was introduced in 1972 during the autocratic Panchayat regime
subdividing the country into four development regions: Eastern, Central,
Western, and Far Western. Later in 1982, the Far-Western Region of that
time was split into two, Mid-Western and Far-Western Regions, thus
making a total of five regions in the country. Such a regional structure was
introduced to create a series of north-south growth axes or development
corridors to tie-in the economy of Tarai with those of the hills, so as to
promote complimentarity between the two topographical economies by
facilitating movement of trade, labor, and capital (Gurung H. 2005). Thus,
the current regional structure was purely a conception of the elite and
development experts on the top of the ruling hierarchy; it was not a grass
root demand of people. This structure was designed neither for devolution
of political power to the people nor for addressing any grievances of the
marginalized socio-cultural groups of people. On the contrary, the original
proponents of this regional structure viewed cultural and linguistic
diversity as potentially destructive to unity of nation and an impediment to
economic development of the country (Pradhan and Shrestha 2005). This
view continues even now among many elite in the country. For this
reason, it is not surprising that leaders of indigenous nationalities and
Madhesis (INM) strongly reject any federal proposal that is based on such
a north-south regional or zonal subdivision. INM leaders interpret a
regional or zonal structure as a deliberate attempt of the State to continue
Panchayat’s policy of cultural homogenization, a policy of pushing
citizens of this multicultural society to subdue their individual cultural
identities. According to those leaders, the policy of cultural
homogenization in Nepal actually began even before Panchayat system
and continued during the recent democratic years too. Bhattachan (2003)
argues that during the last 238 years since the territorial unification of
6
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Nepal by King Prithvi Narayan Shah, indigenous nationalities, Madhesis,
Dalits, Muslims and other religion groups have been victims of
domination of one caste – Khas Bahun and Chhetri (KBC), one language –
Khas Nepali, one religion – Hindu, and one culture – Hindu. According to
Lawoti (2005), the neglected sociocultural groups have been denied
cultural and political autonomy to decide on matters relating to their
culture, lifestyles, and other issues that affect them. Lawoti further argues
that the bias of state institutions in favor of Khas-Nepali language has put
non-Khas-Nepali-native speakers in a disadvantaged position and there is
no protection of minority rights against the tyranny of the majority.
Gurung H. (2003b) asserts that even now the state of Nepal has not
emerged as a nation; it is still divided by socio-cultural cleavages and lack
of political will to objectively promote national integration.
According to the 2001 Census, KBC constitute less than 29 percent
of national population, whereas INM constitute 48 percent (excluding
about six percent Newars). Dalits, Muslims, and other similar
marginalized groups make up 16 percent in the national population.
Disproportionate to their population size, KBCs enjoy a very dominant
position in the educational and political spheres, which is not unexpected
because the groups that hold de jure and/or de facto political power in a
country choose the nature of political institutions and economic
institutions and thus the distribution of resources (Acemoglu et. al. 2004).
Eighty-seven percent of all gazetted third class officers of Nepal
Government in 2001/02 were KBC, compared to just four percent INM.
KBC represented almost 60 percent of all persons with bachelor or higher
degree, whereas INM made up meager 16 percent in 2001. KBC filled up
47 percent of the membership of the two houses of parliament and twothird of the central committee members of the three largest political parties
– NC, UML, and RPP – whereas, INM had these shares of 40 percent and
26 percent in 1999 (UNDP 2004; see Annexes 3 and 4, p. 171-178).
Further, the ethnic breakdown of human development index (HDI)
available for 1996 reveals that, except Newars who ranked first with HDI
of 0.457, all other sociocultural groups ranked lower than KBC. Khas
Bahun’s HDI was 0.441, Chhetri’s 0.348, Rajbanshi, Yadav, Tharu, and
Ahir 0.313, Gurung, Magar, Sherpa, Rai, and Limbu 0.299, and
occupational castes, which include Dalits, had HDI of 0.239. Nepal’s
overall HDI in that year was 0.325 (NSAC 1998).
A brief discussion is also due here about the size of states in a
federation. Table 2 compares the federal regions proposed by Bohara for
their shares in the national population, GDP, and national government
7
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revenue (information extracted from CBS 2002, UNDP 2004, and FCGO
2004). It is evident from Table 2 that the Central Region will have the
most dominant presence in Bohara’s proposed federation, with larger than
one-third share of national population, 42 percent contribution to national
GDP, and 79 percent contribution to national revenue. Such a large
population size and economic might may impart an overpowering clout to
this region in the national politics and government, which may be used by
the region to distort distribution of national resources in its favor.
There appears a general preference among federal countries in the
world to have many smaller states, rather than just few large states, in the
federation. The United States of America has 50 states and Canada 10
provinces. Nepal’s neighbor India initially had 25 states, but has now
grown to 28 states. Even Switzerland, a country smaller than one-third of
Nepal in area and population, has 26 autonomous cantons in its federation.
Belgium, another very small country has 11 provinces. Large states often
tend to rub their population size and economic and fiscal might on the
central government to influence distribution of national resources in their
favor. Experience of Nigeria could be relevant here. According to
Ejobowah (2003), Nigeria started as a three-state federation of North,
East, and West. North used its political power to break up West into two
states to reduce the strength of West, the next bigger state. However,
Nigeria later adopted a policy of subdividing the country into a larger
number of equal-sized states: 12 in 1967, 19 in 1976, 21 in 1987, 30 in
1990, and 36 in 1996.
Although the constitution of a country may guarantee equal de jure
power to every state, the de facto political power that is generally implicit
in the population, economic, and fiscal size of a state can prove
overwhelming to the central government to resist political demands of a
large state. A state can exert its de facto power in various forms. It may
use its economic prowess to influence or even buyout favors for the state.
It may threaten disruptions in collection of government revenue. Or, it
may hire and instigate activists to call bands and strikes to disrupt
economic activities. Everything else the same, a larger number of smaller
states allows more options to the central government to play the game of
divide-and-rule and/or to facilitate or force states to change their interest
coalitions, whenever necessary for the stability of the federation. A twotrack policy of “carrot and stick” – a policy of willingness to listen to
discontents and helping resolve the discontents, combined with a policy of
willingness to use the coercive method of fiscal power and/or security
force of the central government – is likely to work better with smaller
8
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states than large states. In Nepal where there is a growing practice of
violent street demonstrations in support of political demands, which often
tend to disrupt economic activities and cause property losses and
inconveniences to the general public, the size of constituent states in the
future federation warrants very careful consideration.
The last row of Table 2 presents the socio-cultural structure of the
population of each region proposed by Bohara. It is evident that KBC
would remain the single largest population group in four of the five
regions, to the discomfort of INM leaders. To allow a greater participation
of INM in the legislative process, Bohara proposes a mixed proportional
representation (PR) system for regional assemblies, which may help
partially inhibit ethnic conflicts (Saideman et al. 2002). But, the PR
system alone is not likely to satisfy the marginalized ethnic groups in
Nepal who are demanding ethnicity-based autonomous regions. The
decade-long Maoist insurgency with its slogan of autonomous ethnic
states has heightened their aspirations. Also, the insurgency has turned the
country more violence-prone. In the event that the demand for
autonomous ethnic states is denied, it would not be surprising if there
begins more ethnic violence and even another insurgency in the future. A
precursor is already in sight, in the form of mini-insurgency instigated by
the Janatantrik Tarai Mukti Morcha in the eastern Tarai of Nepal, in the
form of the recent Madhes-bandh organized by the Nepal Sadbhawana
Party that culminated into a serious communal riot in Nepalgunj in
December 2006, and in the form of still on-going resistance movement
organized by the Madhesi People’s Right Forum, which recently turned
into a brutal carnage in Gaur. If hill-based indigenous nationalities, like
Limbus, Rais, and Newars also wage a similar struggle, ethnic tensions
could prove a potentially explosive national issue in future.
Finally, one more point about Bohara’s proposal; he extends the
argument of ease of harnessing of water resources in support of his
proposal. Indeed, inter-state water conflicts have been observed to create
problems in harnessing water resources in India, America, and other
countries. Protracted inter-state negotiations and delayed agreement over
sharing of water can result in inefficient investments in water projects and
related agriculture and industrial activities (Richards and Singh 1996).
Obviously, Bohara assumes that having hill and Tarai areas of the same
river basin under the same regional government would minimize inter-area
water conflicts. This could be true; but, in federal Nepal major water
projects are likely to remain the responsibility of the central government,
because they require huge investments and tend to have international
9
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relation implications. Even in the current unitary system of governance,
Nepal has been witnessing problems and disputes related to water
resources, for example those with Arun, Melamchi, and Marsyangdi
projects. This issue needs more careful consideration in any federation
proposal, territorial or cultural, including the need of a constitutionally
competent central agency, like a Water Development Board.
Let us now examine other territorial federation proposals. The
proposal of Devkota and Gautam (2006) uses the three major river basins
of the country as the basis for subdivision of regions. In this proposal, the
Koshi region will be carved out of the Koshi basin, which spans from
Mechi zone in the east to Janakpur in the west. Similarly, Gandaki region
from the Gandaki basin that spans from Narayani zone in the east to
Lumbini in the west, but Kathmandu Valley is excluded. Karnali region or
basin spans to the rest of the country to the west of Gandaki region.
Besides these three river-basin regions, Devkota and Gautam propose a
separate Kathmandu Valley Region. The Chief of every region shall be
directly elected by the voters of the region, but the Regional Council – the
legislative arm of the region – shall consist of the elected chiefs of each
local government unit (100 to 150 units) within the region. Thus, there
would be no separate election for Regional Council and no direct method
of ensuring proportional representation (PR) of various socio-cultural
groups in the Council. Instead, Devkota and Gautam propose a mixed PR
system for the national assembly. Thus, compared to Bohara’s proposal,
there is even less consideration paid to the socio-cultural diversity of the
country by Devkota and Gautam. Consider the numbers in Table 3. The
two issues discussed earlier in the context of Bohara proposal remain valid
for this proposal also. One is the issue of whether a country should go for
a large number of smaller states or just a few large states. The three basinstates are individually large states. Another is the issue of acceptability of
this proposal to INM, given that KBC would remain the most dominant
group in three of the four regions of this proposal (see Table 3).
Socio-cultural cleavages of Nepal would not vanish with the
creation of a territorial federation. Let us consider a scenario here. How
would or should Koshi Region government react to a demand for making
Maithili or Hindi an official language of that region? How would or
should Kathmandu Valley government react to a similar demand for
making Newari or Nepal Bhasha an official language of Kathmandu
Valley? If the demands are not met, ethnic tensions may escalate in those
regions. Language may become a national issue if other groups like
Bhojpuri, Tharu, and Kirat from other regions join the struggle. A
10
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territorial federation simply postpones such problems, it does not resolve
them. Socio-cultural and religious cleavages cannot be ignored for long;
they keep resurging with bigger force, threatening peace and stability of
the country. Just look at what is happening in Sri Lanka!
Unlike the above two proposals, a proposal by Limbu (2003)
attempts to partially accommodate the demand of INM through a proposal
of cultural federation within a territorial federation. Limbu proposes
seven autonomous zones in the country – Pallo Kirat, Majh Kirat, Ollo
Kirat, Tamuwan, Magarat, Karnali, and Mahakali – instead of 14 zones
that currently exist in the country. vi He also proposes each zone to have
three to 13 ethnicity and/or language-based subunits for individually
empowering various language and ethnic groups that reside in the zone.
Finally, he proposes a proportional representation system for legislative
assemblies in the zones. Table 4 compares the population, economic size,
and socio-cultural structure of the proposed seven zones.
There are three issues with Limbu’s proposal. First, Ollo Kirat
would be a very large state with a potentially domineering role in the
federation; its lone contributions to the federation would exceed one-half
of national revenue and one-third of national GDP. Second, the proposal
of federation-within-federation sounds complex, and it is unclear whether
small ethnic subunits within a zone can satisfy the aspirations of
ethnic/language groups, especially that of Madhesis who make up a large
majority in Tarai and aspire for their own autonomous states. Third, the
ethnic names that are attached to zones could be controversial. For
example, the Maithili-speaking people who make up the largest population
group in Majh Kirat and Ollo Kirat may like to name their states as East
Mithila and West Mithila. Similarly, the two biggest population groups of
Tamuwan, KBC and Bhojpuri-speaking people may not like the name
Tamuwan, as it is identified with Gurungs only. This naming issue points
to the wisdom of choosing non-ethnic secular names for states to avoid
any controversy.
Let us now discuss the Nepal Sadbhawana Party (NSP)’s proposal
for a federation of five autonomous provinces: Eastern Hills, Central Hills,
Western Hills, Eastern Tarai, and Western Tarai. vii The main objective of
this dual-territorial subdivision, a combination of hills vs. Tarai and the
east vs. west subdivision, is to secure the rights of autonomy of Madhesis.
Table 5 compares the population, economic size, and population structure
of the proposed provinces.

11
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True to the objective of the proposal, Madhes-based linguistic and
ethnic groups would be the largest population groups in the two Tarai
provinces. But, KBC would be the largest group in each of the three hill
provinces; so, hill-based indigenous nationalities may not support this
proposal. Additionally, the Eastern Tarai would be a very large province
in this federation with 30 percent or higher shares in national population
and GDP. More formidable would be the combined population, GDP, and
revenue strength of the two Tarai provinces (east and west), which may
become a matter of great concern to those who already suspect threat of
secession with cultural federalism. In other words, to make a federation
proposal more palatable to most people it may be advisable to have only
small states in the federation.
Above were the territorial federation proposals. There are a number of
proposals of another kind, which demarcate states on socio-cultural
grounds. Examples are the proposals of CPN-M (2004), Baral (2004),
Shrestha (2005), Gurung KB (2005), Neupane (2005), Jha (2005),
Chongwang (2006) and Tamang (2005). The shares of major indigenous
nationality groups in the national population as of 2001 Census (relative to
15.8 percent Chhetri and 12.7 percent Khas Brahmin) are: Magar 7.1
percent, Tharu 6.7 percent, Tamang 5.6 percent, Newar 5.5 percent, Rai
2.8 percent, Gurung 2.4 percent, and Limbu 1.6 percent (CBS 2002).
There are other indigenous nationalities also in Nepal, like Chepang,
Dhimal, Satar, and Rajbanshi, but they are either thinly spread around the
country or have insufficient population concentration to justify separate
states for them. Similarly, the five major languages that are spoken as
mother tongue in Nepal are: Nepali 48.6 percent, Maithili 12.3 percent,
Bhojpuri 7.5 percent, Tharu 5.9 percent, and Tamang 5.2 percent. Creating
states based on ethnicity and/or language is a prominent demand of INM
at this transitional period of Nepal when it is embracing to write a new
constitution with an elected constituent assembly. For lack of space, it is
not possible to present and analyze all cultural federalism proposals; but, a
discussion of three such proposals is presented below to illustrate some
important facts, issues and problems associated with cultural federalism.
Let us begin with the Maoists’ proposal of a nine-state federation
presented in Table 6 (CPN-M 2004). viii Three things may be noted about
this proposal:
a. Because of a large number of states in the federation, individual states
are generally small, except the state of Madhes, which is exceptionally
large, having 3.5 to 10 times the population of other states, higher than
one-third of the national GDP, and about 46 percent contribution to
12
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national revenue. Presence of such a large state in the midst of
generally small states may not be conducive to regional balance and
stability of the federation.
b. In spite of ethnic subdivision of states, KBC make up the largest
population group in Kirat, Tamuwan, Magarat, and Newa, which have
been actually proposed for non-KBC socio-cultural groups. This
problem of a target ethnic group not becoming the largest population
group in the state intended for them is not unique to the Maoist
proposal; this problem is found in other ethnic federation proposals
too. In fact, for comparing ethnic group composition in a state, the
proponents of cultural federalism separate Khas Bahun and Chhetri
into two different groups. But, one can easily anticipate that Bahun
and Chhetri will join their political strengths together at the time of
negotiation of carving out culture-based states, because both share the
same language, the same religion, and the same culture. Therefore, it
would be wiser to treat Bahun and Chhetri as one KBC group and to
compare their population with the population of other cultural groups,
as has been done in Table 6 and in other tables that follow.
c. The Maoists have given ethnic names to states, except for the two
states that consist of 15 hill and mountain districts of Bheri, Karnali,
Seti, and Mahakali zones. KBC make up the largest population group
in each of these 15 districts; yet, these two states have been named
after rivers, instead of KBC-culture-related names. Such a naming
practice may be perceived as a policy of reverse discrimination of
KBC, for the purpose of appeasing INM. Once again, this
contradiction in naming states reinforces my earlier argument that it
would be wiser to choose non-ethnic secular names for states.
The next is a 14-state proposal of Shrestha (2005); the details of which
are presented in Table 7, and about which the following observations can
be made. ix
a. As this proposal chooses to have many (14) states, states are more
homogenous in size with no domineering presence of any state.
b. This proposal suggests a separate state – Awadh – for Awadhispeaking people (ASP). But, Bhojpuri-speaking people, not ASP,
become the largest group in that state. In fact, even a quick analysis of
population data reveals that it is not possible to create a state where
ASP would become the largest group. x This is because ASP
population is concentrated only in Kapilbastu and Banke, which are
separated by Dang where this population is almost non-existent.
13
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c. This proposal carves out a state Kochilla – consisting of Jhapa,
Morang, and Sunsari districts – for the purpose of drawing specific
attention to the concentration of few native ethnic groups that reside in
this area. They are Dhimal, Rajbansi, Tajpuriya, Satar, and Jhangad.
However, even the combined population of these native groups is very
small, compared to those of KBC, Maithili, and Tharu.
d. Like in the Maoist proposal, in this proposal too KBC would be the
largest group in the states meant for Limbu, Rai, Newar, Gurung, and
Magar. Similarly, it also exhibits reverse discrimination of KBC by
naming the two KBC-majority states after rivers: Karnali and
Mahakali.
Now, let us examine one more proposal – Gurung KB (2005) – that
proposes 11 states in the federation (see Table 8). xi The following are the
comments on this proposal.
a. States are generally small, except for the domineering presence of
Maithili-Tharu state.
b. This proposal successfully demarcates a state for Limbus where they
indeed make up the largest population group. But, the proposal could
not do the same for Rai, Newar, Gurung, and Magar.
c. Unlike the above two cultural federalism proposals, this proposal
names the two KBC-dominated western hill states as West Khasan and
Far-West Khasan.
Conclusions and Recommendations
A country has to find the political structure that best meets the
aspirations of its people in the particular political and economic context of
the country. In the current context of Nepal, a territorial federation may be
called a mechanistic approach of creating states, because this approach
considers physical resources, infrastructure, physical distances, and terrain
as more important than the aspirations of cultural autonomy of a sizeable
population of marginalized citizens of the country. On the other hand, a
cultural federation would be a humanistic approach of creating states,
because fulfilling the aspirations and demand of the marginalized groups
of people would be the most important goal. The first approach attempts to
equally subdivide resources and development potential to maximize the
potential level of income of each constituent political subunit. But, this
approach works best when the population is homogeneous in preferences.
In a country of diverse population groups it ignores an important fact that
14
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what individuals look for is not the income but preference-adjusted or
hedonic income. It should not be surprising if a Maithili-speaking
individual of Mahottari district passes an opportunity of earning Rs.
15,000 every month in Manang in favor of earning only Rs. 12,000 in
his/her own home district, or if a Tamang of Kavre district makes a similar
choice of passing a higher income opportunity in Kapilbastu district in
favor of somewhat lower income in his/her own district. Therefore, more
important is to find ways of equally subdividing the potential of personal
satisfaction of individual groups of citizens than to find ways of equally
subdividing the means of production. In this respect, the above-mentioned
humanistic approach of cultural subdivision of states in my view offers a
greater promise; therefore, it also offers a better prospect of durable peace
and stability of federation.
Proponents of territorial federation assume that a mixed or pure
proportional representation system of national and provincial legislative
assemblies will suffice to dissuade ethnic and linguistic groups of people
from demanding cultural autonomy. This is a big assumption. Ethnic
tensions will simmer in territorial federation and may explode if various
ethnic interest groups of the country find it necessary to act in unison and
to pursue violent means to back up their demand of cultural autonomy.
The insurgency currently waged by the two factions of Janatantrik Tarai
Mukti Morcha in east Tarai, the recent Tarai bandhs first organized by the
Nepal Sadbhawana Party and now by the Madhesi People’s Right Forum,
the communal violence that erupted in Nepalgunj, and the brutal carnage
in Gaur are the warning signals of this trend. Cultural federation may
preempt this trend by letting ethnic interest groups have cultural autonomy
in the states meant for them.
Ethnic groups in Nepal are demanding autonomy only; they are not
demanding independence or secession. Also, by subdividing the country
into small federal states, secession can be made practically less viable.
Experiences of other countries have shown that a cultural federation helps
to quarantine socio-cultural tensions within the boundaries of affected
states, and the rest of the country can continue to function normally. When
states are small, the size of affected masses also will remain small; which
shall allow a greater flexibility to the central government to use its fiscal
and/or security powers to negotiate, motivate, or coerce the state
governments to solve the local problems in the overall interest of the
nation. At the time of negotiation of new constitution in the constituent
assembly, the coercive power of the central government can be
strengthened by making cultural autonomy to states contingent on
15
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acceptance of constitutional emergency powers of the central government
to intervene in a state at times of grave threat to communal harmony and
territorial integrity of the nation. xii
When states are created based on relative cultural homogeneity,
state governments shall find it easier to tailor their services to best suit the
specific preferences of their residents; this would potentially improve the
economic efficiency of governmental services. For example, states that
have a large Tharu population can declare “Maghi” as a holiday, whereas
states with large number of Muslims can declare Id a holiday. States
located in hills can focus on horticulture and animal husbandry and on
health problems more prevalent in such areas, whereas the states in Tarai
can focus on food cultivation, manufacturing, malaria eradication, and
similar other areas of greater concern to the local people. Cultural
federalism has a better potential of making more people happier.
Few objective conditions of the country need to be recognized for
creating culture-based states. An examination of district-wise distribution
of population shows that only KBC, Maithili-speaking people (MSP), and
Bhojpuri-speaking people (BSP) have the necessary population
concentration to create states where they can have their majority. KBC are
in majority in 15 districts, MSP in five districts, and BSP in four districts.
Magar, Tharu, Tamang, Newar, Awadhi, and Gurung have majority in one
district only, whereas Rai and Limbu have no majority in any district. If a
state is proposed for a specific cultural group, say Group A, this proposal
can be considered reasonable only if Group A becomes at least the largest
of all the cultural groups that reside in that state. To this criterion if we add
another criterion that a state must at least be as large as three contiguous
districts, we can demarcate 13 states for seven socio-cultural groups (see
Table 9 and the enclosed map). xiii These groups and the number of states
intended for them are: one state (Hills-1) for Limbu, one state (Hills-2) for
Rai, six states (Hills-3, 6, 8, 9, and 10 and Tarai-1) for KBC, one state
(Tarai-2) for Maithili-speaking people, two states (Tarai-3 and 4) for
Bhojpuri-speaking people, one state (Tarai-5) for Tharu, and one state
(Hills-4) for Tamang.
It is simply not possible to demarcate states with at least three
contiguous districts where Newar, Magar, and Gurung can become the
largest cultural group. An alternative is to consider Kathmandu Valley
(Hills-5) for Newars where their population (35 percent) would be pretty
close to the 36 percent population share of KBC. Similarly, Hills-7 state
can be created where the combined population of Gurung and Magar
would be at least as large as that of the next competing group of KBC. In
16
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this way, there shall be 15 states altogether in this proposal and all states
would be small in size, with no domineering presence of any state.
A unique feature of this proposal is that Chitwan would not be a
part of any Tarai state. Not even one percent of population in Chitwan
speaks a Tarai language. On the contrary, 40 percent of them belong to
KBC group. Therefore, Chitwan has been grouped with Gorkha and
Dhading to create a state for KBC. In effect, Chitwan in this proposal ends
up dividing Tarai in two parts, to its east there would be three Tarai states
and to the west two Tarai states.
In spite of attempts of creating states based on cultural
homogeneity, there would still remain a number of cultural groups in
sizeable population in almost every state. Therefore, it would be wise to
give non-ethnic secular names to states to clearly convey the message that
states would not discriminate among cultural groups. For the same reason,
it would be advisable to have a proportional representation system for
state assemblies and to have an independent cultural board in each state to
advise the state government on matters related to the practice of language,
culture, and religion in the state.
A system of proportional representation in the assembly often
forces politics of coalition, alliances, and compromise, which sometimes
can make formation and durability of government difficult. Therefore, a
system of directly elected governor or the chief executive of state should
be adopted to provide stable state governments. Only three layers of
government – national, state level, and the village level – would be
needed; the current district structure can be abolished.
This paper concludes that cultural federalism is the best option
available for Nepal for maximizing chances of political stability by
minimizing ethnic, cultural, and linguistic tensions in the country.
Important is to have 10 or more states, with non-ethnic names of states and
with no state having a dominant size; to this end the paper makes a 15state proposal. But, having culturally subdivided states is not sufficient for
federalism. Empowerment of states with the necessary constitutional
competence, institutional infrastructure, and appropriate fiscal
relationships and economic policies will determine the success of federal
system; this paper does not delve on those issues. From an empirical
analysis of the moments of constitutional founding in 17 west European
nation-states between the 18th and 20th centuries, Ziblat (2005) has
concluded that for a country to successfully end up with a federal system
of governance two factors should jointly be present at the time of founding
17
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of federation: the political ideology of the founders of the new constitution
in support of federalism and the existence of supporting institutional
structure at the level of political subunits. The first factor is present in
Nepal in the form of commitment for federal system expressed by major
political parties in the interim constitution. But, the second factor –
institutional structure at the proposed state level – is almost nonexistent.
Therefore, the path to federalism is difficult and will require cooperation
among different political parties and socio-cultural groups for federalism
to succeed.
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Table 1: PCI and HDI of Regional and Topographic Subdivisions
Region

Eastern Region
Central Region
Western Region
Mid-Western
Region
Far Western
Region
NEPAL

Whole Region

Mountain

Hills

Tarai

% PCI

HDI

HDI

0.493
0.490
0.491
0.402

0.477
0.425
0.488
0.347

%
PCI
81
159
94
66

HDI

92
122
96
76

%
PCI
98
88
197
76

82

0.404

73

0.355

100

0.471

86

0.386

HDI

0.500
0.547
0.489
0.417

%
PCI
96
93
98
86

72

0.403

95

0.450

109

0.512

94

0.478

0.491
0.451
0.494
0.440

Table 2: Population, Economic, and Fiscal Sizes of Regions in Bohara
Proposal
Region

Eastern

Central

Western

% population share
% GDP share
% PCI
% revenue share
Largest population groups
(% regional population)

23
21
92
10
Maithili
(25)
KBC
(21)
Rai
(10)
Limbu
(6)

35
42
122
79
KBC (19)
Maithili
(18)
Bhojpuri
(17)
Tamang
(12)

20
19
96
8
KBC (30)
Magar
(15)
Bhojpuri
(12)
Awadhi
(8)
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Midwestern
13
10
76
2
KBC (33)
Tharu (14)
Magar
(12)
Awadhi
(7)

Farwestern
9
8
82
1
KBC
(52)
Tharu
(16)
Magar
(2)
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Table 3: River-Basin-Based Territorial Subdivision (Devkota-Gautam
Proposal)
Region
% population share
% GDP share
% PCI
% revenue share
Largest population
groups
(% regional
population)

Koshi
34
29
84
12
Maithili (34)
KBC (17)
Rai (7)
Tamang (5)

Gandaki
36
38
104
40
KBC (26)
Bhojpuri (21)
Magar (10)
Tamang (8)

Karnali
23
17
78
3
KBC (41)
Tharu (15)
Magar (8)
Awadhi (4)

Kathmandu
7
16
224
45.6
KBC (36)
Newar (35)
Tamang (9)
Magar (3)

Table 4: Population, Economic, and Fiscal Sizes of Zones in Limbu Proposal
Zone
%
population
share
% GDP
share
% PCI
% revenue
share
Largest
population
groups
(% zonal
population)

Pallo
Kirat
13

Majh
Kirat
10

Ollo
Kirat
29

Tamuwan

Magarat

Karnali

Mahakali

15

17

9

8

14

7

36

15

14

7

7

104
9.1

75
0.8

124
51.4

106
28.5

83
7.2

76
1.8

86
1.1

KBC
(26)
Maithili
(13)
Limbu
(11)
Rai (8)

Maithili
(40)
KBC
(14)
Rai (13)
Tharu (5)

Maithili
(21)
KBC
(19)
Tamang
(13)
Newar
(12)

KBC
(29)
Bhojpuri
(18)
Magar
(10)
Gurung
(10)

KBC
(32)
Magar
(18)
Bhojpuri
(9)
Tharu
(7)

KBC
(35)
Tharu
(13)
Awadhi
(10)
Magar
(5)

KBC
(51)
Tharu
(19)
Magar
(2)
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Table 5: Population, Economic, and Fiscal Sizes of Provinces in NSP
Proposal
Province
% population
share
% GDP share
% PCI
% revenue
share
Largest
population
groups
(% provincial
population)

Eastern
Hills
12

Central
Hills
15

Western
Hills
25

Eastern
Tarai
31

Western
Tarai
17

8
83
0.7

24
164
48.8

21
82
1.9

30
95
39.0

16
16
9.6

KBC (28)
Rai (16)
Tamang
(10)
Limbu (9)

KBC (33)
Tamang
(23)
Newar
(22)
Magar (4)

KBC (46)
Magar
(15)
Gurung
(5)
Newar (2)

Maithili
(38)
Bhojpuri
(19)
KBC (11)
Tharu (7)

Tharu (25)
KBC (23)
Bhojpuri
(14)
Awadhi
(14)
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Table 6: Cultural Federalism Proposal of CPN (M)
States

%
population
share
9

%
GDP
share
7

%
PCI
84

%
revenue
share
0.6

Madhes

39

37

95

45.7

Tambasaling

11

11

100

3.3

Newa

7

16

224

45.6

Tamuwan

7

8

105

1.3

Magarat

9

6

74

0.4

Tharuwan

10

9

90

2.9

Bheri-Karnali

4

3

71

0.1

SetiMahakali

5

4

72

0.1

Kirat

22

Largest groups
(% state
population)
KBC (27),
Rai (21)
Limbu (12),
Tamang (7)
Maithili (31),
Bhojpuri (22)
KBC (12),
Tharu (8)
Tamang (31),
KBC (31)
Newar (9),
Magar (6)
KBC (36),
Newar (35)
Tamang (9),
Magar (3)
KBC (37),
Gurung (17)
Magar (12),
Newar (5)
KBC (41),
Magar (28)
Newar (2),
Gurung (1)
Tharu (35),
KBC (28)
Awadhi (9),
Magar (4)
KBC (38),
Magar (10)
Gurung (1)
KBC (67),
Magar (1)
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Table 7: Fourteen-State Shrestha Proposal
States

%
GDP
share
4

%
PCI

Yakthung

%
population
share
4

Khambu

4

3

78

Tambasaling

10

10

100

Nepal Mandal

7

16

224

Tamu Gandak

4

4

113

Magar Gandak

11

9

82

Bheri

5

3

64

Karnali

1

1

79

Mahakali
Kochila

4
9

3
10

76
110

Mithila

13

9

67

Bhojpuri

9

10

117

Awadh

8

7

98

Tharuhat

10

9

90

23

90

%
Largest groups
revenue
(% state population)
share
0.3
KBC (26), Limbu (23)
Rai (17), Tamang (7)
0.3
KBC (29), Rai (26)
Magar (8), Tamang (7)
3.3
Tamang (31), KBC
(31)
Newar (9), Magar (6)
45.6
KBC (36), Newar (35)
Tamang (9), Magar (3)
1.1
KBC (36), Gurung (23)
Newar (6), Tamang (3)
0.6
KBC (42), Magar (28)
Gurung (4), Newar (3)
0.1
KBC (38), Magar (8)
Gurung (1)
0.04
KBC (51), Gurung (2)
Magar (1), Tamang (1)
0.1
KBC (69), Magar (1)
8.8
KBC (26), Maithili
(19) Tharu (7), Rai (5)
2.2
Maithili (77), Bhojpuri
(4)
Tharu (4), Tamang (1)
27.9
Bhojpuri (61), KBC
(10)
Tharu (9), Tamang (2)
6.7
Bhojpuri (31), Awadhi
(20) KBC (16), Tharu
(13)
2.9
Tharu (34), KBC (28)
Awadhi (9), Magar (4)
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Table 8: Eleven-State Gurung Proposal
States

%
population
share
3

%
GDP
share
3

%
PCI
89

%
revenue
share
0.2

Khumbuwan

6

5

81

0.4

Maithili – Tharu

29

27

92

36.4

Tambasaling

10

10

100

3.3

Newar

7

16

224

45.6

Tamu

4

4

113

1.1

Magarat

10

8

82

0.5

Tharu – Bhojpuri

10

10

105

9.4

West Khasan

6

4

70

0.2

Tharuhat

10

9

90

2.9

Far-West Khasan

5

4

72

0.1

Limbuwan

24

Largest groups
(% state population)
Limbu (30), KBC
(27)
Rai (14), Tamang (6)
KBC (29), Rai (25)
Magar (8), Tamang
(7)
Maithili (41),
Bhojpuri (20) KBC
(9), Tharu (6)
Tamang (31), KBC
(31)
Newar (9), Magar (6)
KBC (36), Newar
(35)
Tamang (9), Magar
(3)
KBC (36), Gurung
(23)
Newar (6), Tamang
(3)
KBC (41), Magar
(29)
Gurung (4), Newar
(3)
Bhojpuri (24), KBC
(21) Awadhi (16),
Tharu (13)
KBC (39), Magar
(11)
Gurung (1)
Tharu (34), KBC (28)
Awadhi (9), Magar
(4)
KBC (67), Magar (1)
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Table 9: My Federation Proposal
State

%
%
population GDP
share
share

% PCI

%
revenue
share

Hills-1

3

3

89

0.2

Hills-2

4

3

85

0.2

Tarai-1

9

10

110

8.8

Tarai-2

13

9

67

2.2

Hills-3

4

4

75

0.3

Tarai-3

7

8

113

25

Hills-4

7

8

109

3.2

Hills-5

7

16

224

45.6

Hills-6

4

5

106

2.7

25

Largest
population
groups
(% state
population)
Limbu (30),
KBC (27)
Rai (14),
Tamang (9)
Rai (31),
KBC (27)
Tamang (7),
Newar (5)
KBC (26),
Maithili (19)
Tharu (7),
Rai (6)
Maithili (77),
Thrau (4)
Bhojpuri (4),
Tamang (1)
KBC (39),
Tamang (12)
Magar (10),
Rai (8)
Bhojpuri
(79), Tharu
(8)
KBC (2),
Maithili (1)
Tamang (37),
KBC (30)
Newar (9),
Magar (5)

Khas (36),
Newar (35)
Tamang (9),
Magar (3)
KBC (35),

Districts

Taplejung,
Panchthar, Ilam,
Terhathum
Sankhuwasabha,
Solukhumbu,
Khotang,
Bhojpur,
Dhankuta
Jhapa, Morang,
Sunsari

Saptari, Siraha,
Dhanusha,
Mahottari,
Sarlahi
Dolakha,
Ramechhap,
Okhaldhunga,
Udayapur
Rautahat, Bara,
Parsa

Sindhupalchok,
Rasuwa,
Nuwakot,
Kavrepalanchok,
Sindhuli,
Makawanpur
Kathmandu,
Lalitpur,
Bhaktapur
Dhading, Gorkha,
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Gurung (11)
Tamang (10),
Newar (7)
Bhojpuri
(31), Awadhi
(20)
KBC (16),
Tharu (13)
KBC (36),
Magar (23)
Gurung (13),
Newar (5)

Tarai-4

8

7

98

6.7

Hills-7

7

7

105

1.3

Hills-8

8

5

72

0.3

KBC (44),
Magar (23)
Newar (1),
Gurung (1)

Tarai-5

10

9

90

2.9

Hills-9

3

2

74

0.1

Hills-10

6

4

70

0.2

Tharu (35),
KBC (29)
Awadhi (9),
Magar (4)
KBC (54),
Thakuri (7)
Sherpa (1),
Gurung (1)
KBC (55),
Thakuri (9)
Magar (7),
Gurung (1)
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Chitwan

Nawalparasi,
Rupandehi,
Kapilbastu

Manang,
Mustang,
Myagdi, Kaski,
Lamjung,
Tanahu, Syangja,
Palpa
Rukum, Baglung,
Parbat, Salyan,
Rolpa, Pyuthan,
Gulmi,
Arghakhanchi
Dang, Banke,
Bardiya, Kailali,
Kanchanpur
Dolpa, Mugu,
Jumla, Kalikot,
Bajura, Bajhang,
Humla, Darchula
Surkhet, Dailekh,
Jajarkot,
Achham, Doti,
Baitadi,
Dadeldhura
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Endnotes

i

The very first meeting of the forthcoming constitution assembly shall decide by simple
majority whether monarchy shall be abolished or retained in a ceremonial form.
Irrespective of the outcome, this paper assumes that Nepal shall enjoy democracy and
that the purpose of federalism is to empower people by bringing government closer to
them.
ii
Through a study of 116 countries, which consisted of 264 ethnic groups and for which
data were available for a period of 14 years (1985-1998), Saideman et al. (2002)
empirically tested and verified their hypothesis that “ethnic protests and rebellion were
more likely in democracies than in authoritarian regimes.” Ethnic protest is more likely in
democracies than in authoritarian regimes, because the costs of protesting to individuals
engaged in such protests are usually less and because politicians are more willing to listen
and accommodate to grievances in democracies. Political parties tend to be organized
along ethnic fault-lines in democracy, and the nature of democratic competition among
political parties in the politics of ballot (compared to the nature of competition in
authoritarian regime) also contributes to ethnic protests for leaders to get their messages
or voices heard and supported by a larger audience.
iii
Initiatives or policies that have worked well in one state may be easily adopted by other
states. There is an implicit political pressure among state leaders to do at least as well off
or even better than other states. But, there could be a downside to this horizontal
competition. Fiscal competition among states may lower tax base of higher-tax states, by
inducing a capital flight to lower-tax states. This can potentially cause a downward spiral
trend of competition among states to reduce tax rates and may severely limit their ability
to supply public goods and to undertake redistributive programs. Also, states that lag
behind in raising adequate tax revenues may devolve into living off the fiscal transfers
from well-off states. Therefore, horizontal fiscal relationships among states and the
vertical fiscal relationship between the center and the states need to be appropriately
established in the federal constitution.
iv
A caution is due here. The federal structure is just one piece of the puzzle; it may not
improve economic efficiency, unless the various layers of government commit to
providing efficient public goods, to not bailing out inefficient public or private programs,
and to preserving market incentives (Qian and Weingast 1997). The discussion on these
aspects is outside the scope of this paper, as it only focuses on the bare bone structure of
federation.
v
The 25 federal countries are Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, BosniaHerzegovina, Brazil, Canada, Comoros, Ethiopia, Germany, India, Malaysia, Mexico,
Micronesia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Russia, South Africa, Spain, St Kitts and Nevis,
Switzerland, United Arab Emirates, United States, Venezuela, and Yugoslavia (Galtung
2003).
vi
Mahakali (Bajhang, Darchula, Doti, Dadeldhura, Baitadi, Kaliali, and Kanchanpur),
Karnali (Jumla, Kalikot, Mugu, Humla, Bajura, Surkhet, Dailekh, Jajarkot, Achham,
Banke, and Bardiya), Magarat (Mustang, Dolpa, Myagdi, Parbat, Baglung, Gulmi, Palpa,
Arghakhanchi, Pyuthan, Rolpa, Rukum, Salyan, Rupandehi, Kapilbastu, and Dang),
Tamuwan (Manang, Dhading, Gorkha, Lamjung, Tanahu, Syangja, Kaski, Parsa,
Chitawan, and Nawalparasi), Ollo Kirat (Dolakha, Sindhupalchok, Rasuwa, Sindhuli,
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Ramechhap, Kavrepalanchok, Lalitpur, Bhaktapur, Kathmandu, Nuwakot, Makawanpur,
Dhanusha, Mahottari, Sarlahi, Rautahat, and Bara), Majh Kirat (Sankhuwasabha,
Solukhumbu, Bhojpur, Okhaldhunga, Khotang, Udayapur, Saptari, and Siraha), and Pallo
Kirat (Taplejung, Panchthar, Ilam, Dhankuta, Terhathum, Jhapa, Morang, and Sunsari)
vii
Eastern Hills include hills of Mechi, Koshi, Sagarmatha, and Janakpur zones; Central
Hills include Bagmati zone and Makawanpur; Western Hills include the remaining hill
districts of the country; Eastern Tarai includes Tarai districts from Jhapa in the east to
Chitwan on the west; and Western Tarai includes Tarai districts spanning from
Nawalparasi to Kanchanpur.
viii
Madhes includes Tarai districts from Jhapa to Kapilbastu, Tharuwan includes the
remaining Tarai districts in the west from Dang to Kanchanpur, Kirat includes Mechi,
Koshi, and Sagarmatha zones, Magarat includes Lumbini, Rapti, and Dhaulagiri zones,
Tamuwan includes Gandaki zone and Mustang, Tambasaling includes Janakpur zone,
Bagmati zone, and Makawanpur, but not Kathmandu Valley, Newa consists of
Kathmandu Valley, Bheri-Karnali consists of the two zones named, and Seti-Mahakali
also consists of the two zones named.
ix
States and districts in the states are: Yakthung (Taplejung, Panchthar, Ilam, Terhthum,
Dhankuta, Sankhuwasabha), Khumbu (Solukhumbu, Khotang, Bhojpur, Udaypur,
Okhaldhunga), Tambasaling (Sindupalchok, Kavrepalanchok, Rasuwa, Nuwakot,
Dhading, Makawanpur, Dolakha, Ramechhap, Sindhuli), Nepal Mandal (Kathmandu,
Lalitpur, Bhaktapur), Tamu Gandak (Manang, Mustang, Gorkha, Lamjung, Kaski),
Magar Gandak (Tanahu, Syangja, Parbat, Myagdi, Baglung, Palpa, Gulmi,
Arghakhanchi, Pyuthan, Rolpa, Rukum), Bheri (Salyan, Jajarkot, Surkhet, Dailekh,
Achham, Kalikot), Karnali (Humla, Mugu, Dolpa, Jumla, Bajura), Mahakali (Bajhang,
doti, Darchula, Baitadi, Dadeldhura), Kochila (Jhapa, Morang, Sunsari), Mithila (Saptari,
Siraha, Dhanusha, Mahottari, Sarlahi), Bhojpur (Rautahat, Bara, Parsa, Chitwan), Awadh
(Nawalparasi, Rupandehi, Kapilbastu), Tharuhat (Dang, Banke, Bardiya, Kailai,
Kanchanpur)
x
Except when a state is created out of just one district
xi
States and the districts in them are: Limbuwan (all hill districts of Mechi zone and
Terhthum), Khambuwan (all hill districts of Koshi zone, minus Terhthum), Tambasaling
(all hill districts of Janakpur zone and Bagmati zone, plus Makawanpur, minus
Kathmandu Valley), Newar (Kathmandu Valley), Maithili-Tharu (Tarai districts from
Jhapa in the east to Rautahat in the west), Tamu (Gorkha, Lamjung, Kaski, Manang,
Mustang), Magarat (Syangja, Tanahu, Palpa, Parbat, Myagdi, Baglung, Gulmi,
Arghakhanchi, Pyuthan, Rolpa), West Khasan (Salyan, Rukum, Surkhet, Dailekh,
Jajarkot, Jumla, Dolpa, Humla, Mugu, Kalikot), Far West Khasan (Achham, Bajura,
Bajhang, Doti, Darchula, Baitadi, Dadeldhura), Tharuhat (Tarai districts from Dang to
Kanchanpur), Tharu-Bhojpuri (Tarai districts from Chitwan to Kapilbastu).
xii
The objective is to discourage states from pursuing violent and hateful means to
suppress minority ethnic groups or to assert secession. The study of Bolton and Roland
(1997) finds that an “opt-out clause” in the constitution that outlines the process for a
state to secede actually tends to bolster or bind states more with the Union, by
constraining the Union policies to become acceptable to constituent states. Nepal needs to
make such a provision in the future constitution to avoid violence or insurgency as the
only means to this end. The 1990 Constitution of Nepal left no peaceful avenue to abolish
monarchy, and the Maoist insurgency had sympathizers on this score.
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xiii

The criterion of having at least three contiguous districts in a state is motivated by the
suggestion of Gurung H. (2003a) that the existing 75 districts need to be reorganized into
25 districts for improving the financial strength of districts to make decentralization
meaningful.
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